date: december 29th, 2021
time: 10:00 am
venue: room 0411, teaching building 0#, jiuli campus
tencent meeting id: 215-726-543
lecturer: professor jing shao, university of international business and economics
about the lecturer:
jing shao, graduated from the university of british columbia (ubc) in canada in 2010 with a doctorate in management science. in 2012, she entered the department of business management, university of international business and economics, and is currently a professor and doctoral supervisor. jing shao is mainly engaged in research in the field of supply chain management, with research issues covering parallel market supply chains, e-commerce supply chains, new energy vehicle supply chains, etc. she is the first author of the papers published in manufacturing & service operations management, production and operations management, transportation research part b, journal of transport economics and policy, decision sciences and other journals. she won 3 national natural science foundation of china, the first prize of beijing philosophy and social science outstanding achievement award, and the second prize of the ministry of education's high school scientific research outstanding achievement award. at the same time, she serves as an anonymous reviewer for international journals such as production and operations management, iie transactions, decision sciences, etc.
about the lecture:
today the electric vehicle (ev) has been seen as a major way to alleviate the environmental problems in the transport sector; however, the adoption of evs still highly relies on policy schemes. in several major ev markets, a new type of ev policy, the credit policy, has arisen. it requires an auto manufacturer's ev credits to exceed a certain percentage of its total vehicle production. an auto manufacturer can earn the credits by producing ev as well as via purchasing from other auto manufacturers with superfluous credits. how does a credit policy influence manufacturers' ev producing incentives and the social welfare? can the credit policy lead to even higher social welfare if coupled with an ev subsidy? when used alone, is it the credit policy or the ev subsidy policy that leads to higher social welfare? we develop a game-theoretic model to address the above issues. we show that if the gasoline vehicle (gv) manufacturer produces evs itself, the credit policy can increase social welfare when the unit environmental cost of gvs is sufficiently larger than that of evs. if the gv manufacturer purchases credits from an ev manufacturer at a fixed credit trading price, the credit policy can always increase social welfare. however, if the credit trading price is negotiated rather than fixed, the effectiveness of the credit policy can be undermined, leading to a relatively lower social welfare than when the credit trading price is fixed. we also show that a credit-subsidy policy package may not necessarily result in higher social welfare than a single policy. finally, we find that the credit policy leads to higher social welfare than the subsidy policy if the difference in the unit environmental costs between gvs and evs is sufficiently large; otherwise, the subsidy policy outperforms the credit policy.